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Voir Dire: Is There a Constitutional
Right of Access?
By KATHLEEN A. KELLY*
I
Introduction
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,' the United States
Supreme Court held that the right to attend criminal trials by
the public is implicit in the guarantees of the first amendment2
of the Constitution. One year earlier, in Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale,3 the Court held that the sixth amendment' did not af-
ford the public a right of access to a pretrial suppression
hearing in a criminal case. In his concurring opinion in Gan-
nett, Chief Justice Burger highlighted the distinction between
trial and pretrial noting, "the timing of a proceeding [is] likely
to be critical"5 in determining whether the public has a pro-
tected right of access to the courtroom.
Voir dire is established in our judicial process as a prelimi-
nary examination to ascertain the qualifications of potential ju-
rors, including whether a particular juror should be
disqualified for bias or prejudice.6
In United States v. Brooklier,7 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals considered both Gannett and Richmond Newspapers
when it was called on to decide whether the press and the pub-
lic have a constitutional right of access to voir dire. The Brook-
Her decision is significant because it is one of the first circuit
court cases to consider the right of access to voir dire under
* Member, Third Year Class. A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1980.
1. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
2. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. 443 U.S. 368, 369 (1979).
4. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. 443 U.S. at 395.
6. United States v. Wooten, 518 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1975).
7. 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).
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both the Gannett and Richmond Newspapers analyses.' The
court concluded that there is a first amendment right of access
to voir dire in criminal proceedings.' The court reasoned that
because voir dire is "part of the trial itself" it qualifies under
the Richmond Newspapers first amendment access analysis.10
Justice Brennan emphasized in Richmond Newspapers that
"resolution of First Amendment public access claims in indi-
vidual cases must be strongly influenced by the weight of his-
torical practice and by an assessment of the specific structural
value of public access in the circumstances."'" This note dis-
cusses the historical practice and the structural purpose of voir
dire by first distinguishing the sixth amendment, pretrial anal-
ysis in Gannett from the first amendment, trial holding estab-
lished in Richmond Newspapers. The note explores in detail
the distinction between pretrial and trial made by the court in
Brooklier, as well as the distinction made by statutes and com-
mon law. It also examines the history and purpose of voir dire
as a judicial device for screening out potential jurors who are
not impartial. In conclusion, the note suggests that voir dire
be considered under a sixth amendment, pretrial analysis as in
Gannett. Following the reasoning of the Court in Gannett, the
public has no constitutionally guaranteed right to attend voir
dire.
II
Gannett and Richmond Newspapers Distinguished
The U.S. Supreme Court in Gannett concluded that the sixth
amendment did not afford the public a right of access to a pre-
trial suppression hearing.12 The petitioners in Gannett had car-
ried stories in their newspaper about the alleged involvement
of the two defendants in the disappearance and probable mur-
der of a former policeman. During a suppression hearing
where the two defendants moved to suppress statements they
had given to the police, the defense attorneys expressed fear
that the build-up of adverse publicity had jeopardized their cli-
8. During publication of this note, the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to Press Enter. Co. v. California Superior Court of Riverside, 82-556, a case in-
volving the issue of a constitutional right of access to voir dire.
9. 685 F.2d at 1163, 1167.
10. Id. at 1167.
11. 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
12. 443 U.S. at 368-69.
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ents' ability to receive a fair trial and requested that the press
and public be excluded from the hearing. The petitioners, ar-
guing that criminal trials are presumptively open to the public,
moved to set aside the closure order granted by the trial
judge. 13
The Supreme Court framed the issue in Gannett as whether
the Constitution requires that a pretrial procedure such as the
one in this case be open to the public. 4 In support of its con-
clusion that the sixth amendment did not require a public right
of access to the courtroom, the Court noted that the guarantee
of a public trial embodied in the sixth amendment is for the
benefit of the defendant alone.'5 Also, the history of the sixth
amendment shows that pretrial proceedings were never char-
acterized by the same degree of openness as were actual tri-
als. 6 The Court added that publicity concerning pretrial
hearings poses special risks of unfairness because it may in-
form potential jurors of information which is unavailable at the
actual trial.'7 The Court did not decide whether the first
amendment and the fourteenth amendment 18 guarantee to the
public a right to attend trials. 9
The Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers held that the
right of the public to attend criminal trials is implicit in the
guarantees of the first amendment.20 The defendant in Rich-
mond Newspapers, on trial for murder, moved to close the trial
because he did not want the information from the proceedings
to be publicized and then be seen by the jurors. The appel-
lants requested a hearing on a motion to vacate the trial
judge's closure order. They noted that prior to the entry of the
closure order, the trial court had failed to make any evidenti-
ary finding or to consider other less drastic measures to ensure
a fair trial.
The Supreme Court distinguished this case from Gannett.
Richmond Newspapers involved the constitutional right of ac-
13. Id. at 378-79.
14. Id. at 369, 385.
15. Id. at 380-81.
16. Id. at 387-88.
17. Id. at 378.
18. "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This clause is used to apply the first
amendment to the states. See Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652 (1924).
19. 443 U.S. at 392.
20. 448 U.S. at 555.
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cess to trials, whereas Gannett addressed the constitutional
right of access to pretrial proceedings.2
The Court found that "without the freedom to attend such
trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important as-
pects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be eviscer-
ated.' "22 Of significance to the Court was the fact that the trial
judge made no findings to support closure, no inquiry was
made as to whether alternative solutions would have met the
need to ensure a fair trial, and there was no recognition by the
trial court of any constitutional right of the public to attend the
trial.23
In conclusion, the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers
underlined the distinction between a pretrial procedure and
the trial itself by noting, "[i] n contrast to the pretrial proceed-
ing dealt with in Gannett, there exist in the context of the trial
itself various tested alternatives to satisfy the constitutional
demands of fairness."24 Thus, it appears, based on these two
cases, that the Supreme Court looks to the nature of the partic-
ular proceeding-whether it is trial or pretrial-in determining
the public and the media's constitutional right of access.
III
The Distinction Between Pretrial and Trial:
When Does a Trial Begin?
A. The Brookier Decision
In United States v. Brooklier, the Ninth Circuit held that,
under Richmond Newspapers, there is a first amendment ac-
cess right to voir dire .2' The petitioners in Brooklier were a
newspaper publisher and a newspaper reporter. They chal-
lenged four orders of the district court which barred access by
the media and the public to certain portions of the highly pub-
licized proceedings of several defendants charged with viola-
tions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO).26
21. Id. at 581.
22. Id. at 580.
23. Id. at 581.
24. Id.
25. 685 F.2d at 1163, 1167.
26. 18 U.S.C. 1961-68; § 1961 (1) defines racketeering activity as "any act or threat
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing
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One of the challenged orders was for the closure of voir
dire .27 The petitioners contended that this order violated the
first amendment right of the public, including the media, to ac-
cess to criminal proceedings as established by Richmond
Newspapers.28 The government, on the other hand, argued
that the public's first amendment right of access to criminal
proceedings, recognized in Richmond Newspapers, applies
only to trials and, as voir dire is a pretrial procedure, the public
has no such right.29
The Brooklier court dismissed the government's argument
summarily and concluded that "voir dire is generally consid-
ered 'part of the trial itself.' 30 In support of its finding, the
court cited two decisions which also addressed the issue of
whether there is a public right of access to voir dire." The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court in Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee 32 and
the Missouri Supreme Court in Great Falls Tribune v. District
Court33 both concluded, with little discussion, that voir dire is
part of the trial itself. The courts reasoned that the "special
risk" involved in pretrial suppression hearings is not as great
during voir dire because "tainted evidence" is generally not
discussed during the voir dire portion of judicial proceedings.34
The court in Brooklier also relied on the holding in In re
United States ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co. 35 The Eighth Cir-
cuit in Pulitzer, confronted with the issue of whether there is a
first amendment right of access to voir dire, applied Richmond
Newspapers without explaining why voir dire should be con-
sidered under this trial analysis. The court merely concluded:
we find that the in-chambers voir dire of the jurors was inap-
propriate in the absence of an inquiry as to alternate solutions;
in the absence of a recognition of any right under the Constitu-
tion for the public or press to attend the Voir dire examination
in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punish-
able by imprisonment for more than one year ....
27. 685 F.2d at 1166.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1167.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 262 Ark. 87, 553 S.W.2d 270, 271 (1977). The Arkansas court relied on Sirratt v.
State, 240 Ark. 47, 398 S.W.2d 63 (1966), which cited 21 Am. Jur. 299, § 260. This citation
has now been superceded by 21 Am. Jur. 2d 299, § 260, and refers to the time when
jeopardy attaches. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
33. 608 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Mont. 1980).
34. Id. at 120.
35. 635 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1980).
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proceedings; and most importantly, in the absence in the rec-
ord of any articulated reasons for and balancing of the inter-
ests of the public in access to an open court against the rights
of the parties to a fair trial as required by Richmond Newspa-36
pers ....
The Brooklier court also referred to Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court.37 In Globe, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down a Massachusetts statute which required trial judges, at
rape and other sex-offense trials involving an alleged victim
under age 18, to exclude under all circumstances the press and
general public from the courtroom during the testimony of the
victim. 8 In holding that this statute violates the first amend-
ment, the Supreme Court relied on the two principal consider-
ations, emphasized in Richmond Newspapers, which underlie
the public's first amendment right of access to criminal pro-
ceedings: "'[f]irst, the criminal trial historically has been
open to the press and general public' and 'second, the right of
access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in
the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a
whole.' "I'
The court in Brooklier asserted that these two considera-
tions also apply to voir dire. ° The court noted that voir dire is
normally conducted in open court and that public scrutiny of it
would heighten public respect for the procedure.'
B. Historical Analysis
The issue of whether voir dire is part of a trial is not as
straightforward as the court in Brooklier implies. Historically,
there is little to support the proposition that the word "trial" in
the phrase "public trial" includes any event that occurs before
the jury is selected.42 Justice Story once observed that "so far
as authorities or reasoning or forms go, there can be no legal
doubt, that by the term 'trial' [it] is generally intended, in the
36. Id. at 679.
37. 102 S.Ct. 2613 (1982).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2619-20.
40. 685 F.2d at 1167.
41. Id.
42. Note, The Right to Attend Pretrial Criminal Proceedings: Free Speech, Public
Trial, and Priorities in Curbing Pretrial Publicity, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 875, 907 (1977).
The note evaluated the first and the sixth amendment arguments for access to pretrial
hearings. The author suggested that pretrial exclusion orders be employed only when
alternative measures would be inadequate to guarantee a fair trial.
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law, [as] the actual trial of the prisoner by the jury."" Holds-
worth, in his History of English Law, noted "the main part of
the trial consisted in laying the evidence before the court, in
questioning the prisoner upon it and upon the answers which
he made to it and in listening to the remarks and answering the
replies made by the prisoner.""
Others have discussed the trial in a similar manner: "At the
actual trial-the trial of the merits-the ultimate issue of guilt
is to be resolved, and the courts have frequently alluded to this
circumstance in drawing the constitutional and statutory pa-
rameters of the word trial. 45 This latter definition underlines
the difficulty of using a broad-brush approach to interpret the
word "trial." Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court explained, "it
does not follow that because the voir dire examination of the
jurors is a part of the trial that such examination is also part of
the 'trial of the facts.' "46
C. Statutory Interpretation
The word "trial" is used both in legal parlance and in stat-
utes to mean different things.47 Consequently, the time when a
"trial" commences often varies according to the applicable
statute or the particular circumstances. 4 1 Court decisions
which discuss state statutes defining the commencement of a
trial illustrate the diverse standards employed.49
Under a statute requiring a motion before the trial for the
purpose of applying a defendant's right to be present through-
out a felony trial, the Missouri Supreme Court has held that
the trial commences when the impanelling of the jury begins.5 "
On the other hand, this right of the defendant to be present
generally relates to a substantial part of the trial process and
not to "matters merely preliminary, preparatory or ministe-
rial."5 ' Hence, the California Court of Appeal, interpreting a
similar California statute, found the examination of veniremen
and the impanelling of the jury to be mere "ministerial pre-
43. Id. at 906 (citing United States v. Curtis, 25 F.Cas. 726, 728 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826)).
44. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 227 (1926).
45. Note, supra note 42 at 907.
46. Pfleeger v. Swanson, 229 Or. 254, 256; 367 P.2d 406, 408 (1961).
47. Id.
48. 75 AM. JUR. 2D. Trial § 3 (1974).
49. Id.
50. State v. Crocket, 90 Mo. 37; 1 S.W. 753 (1886) interpreting REV. STAT. MO. § 1891.
51. People v. Ferguson, 124 Cal.App. 221, 225-26 (1932).
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liminaries" preceding the beginning of the trial.5 2
Where severance is an issue and the defendant must request
a separate trial before the commencement of the trial, the be-
ginning of a trial is usually when the jury is selected 3 or when
the jury is sworn. 4
Where a statute gives the plaintiff the right to take a volun-
tary dismissal before the trial, some courts, in interpreting
these statutes, have held that a trial commences after the jury
has been duly impanelled.55 In Carvel v. Arents,56 the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal concluded that the "[b]eginning of an
opening statement, or if there be none, the administering of the
oath or affirmation to the first witness, or the introduction of
any evidence is the commencement of the trial."57 Other courts
have held, however, that in this situation, a trial commences
when the prospective jurors are called for an examination of
their qualifications.58
In Crist v. Bretz, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court noted the federal
rule that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is im-
panelled and sworn.6" The Court explained that this rule,
marking the beginning of the trial under Section 12 of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, protects the defendant's interest in retaining
a chosen jury.6 '
Where the law provides a party the right of removal at any
time before trial, the U.S. Supreme Court has found that a trial
had not yet commenced although the cause of action had been
52. Id.
53. Nichols v. Territory, 3 Okla. 622; 41 P. 108 (1895), interpreting § 8, art. 10, c. 68,
Stat. 1893.
54. Radley v. Commonwealth, 121 Ky. 506; 89 S.W. 519 (1905).
55. Reagan v. Dyrenforth, 87 Colo. 126; 285 P. 775 (1930), interpreting COLO. CODE
Crv. PRo. § 184, 1921.
56. 126 Cal.App.2d 776 (1954), interpreting CAL. CODE Crv. PRO. § 581(1).
57. Id. at 779. The court interpreted California Code of Civil Procedure section
581 (1), which provides that, for the purposes of dismissal, "(a) trial shall be deemed to
be actually commenced at the beginning of the opening statement of the plaintiff or his
counsel, and if there shall be no opening statement, then at the time of the administer-
ing of the oath or affirmation to the first witness or the introduction of any evidence.
58. Wilhite v. Agbayani, 2 lll.App.2d 29; 118 N.E.2d 440 (1954) interpreting Civil
Practice Act, § 52 para. 176, ch. 110, Ill. Rev. Stat. § 1953.
59. 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
60. "Jeopardy" is defined as "(t)he danger of conviction and punishment which
the defendant in a criminal action incurs when a valid indictment has been found, and
a petit jury has been impaneled and sworn to try the case and give a verdict in a court
of competent jurisdiction." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 969 (4th ed. 1968).
61. 437 U.S. at 28.
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called for trial and the jury had been sworn.62 The Court ex-
plained, "t I he most that can be said is that preparations were
being made for a trial."63
Finally, where a statute such as that of North Dakota autho-
rizes a change of venue by the parties at any time before the
trial has begun, the trial is said to begin after the jury is
impanelled 4
As the judicial decisions interpreting these statutes suggest,
there is no clearly established rule for defining when a trial be-
gins. Nor are the courts consistent in their consideration of
whether voir dire is part of the trial or merely a preliminary
proceeding prior to the commencement of the trial. Yet, as the
Oregon Supreme Court makes clear, where a statute defines
the beginning of the trial as the commencement of the "trial of
the facts," voir dire is not considered part of the trial.6
D. Common Law Interpretation
Despite the many variations in determining when a trial be-
gins, courts that have considered whether voir dire is part of a
trial for purposes other than the right of access have generally
found voir dire to be pretrial in nature. For example, in United
States v. Mutchler,66 the Fifth Circuit considered the problem
of whether a supplemental voir dire is required when jurors
have served at another trial during the interim between their
initial selection and the beginning of the trial. Mutchler held
that interim jury service in a similar trial or in a trial in which
the same witnesses appeared rendered the prior voir dire
meaningless. 67
In United States v. Price,68 the Fifth Circuit addressed the
question whether the defendants were entitled to a new trial
when a significant delay occurred between the selection of the
jury and the start of the trial. The court expanded its holding
in Mutchler and concluded that, even without a showing of in-
terim jury service, when a significant lapse of time occurs be-
tween the selection of the jury and the commencement of the
62. Yulee v. Vose, 99 U.S. 539, 545 (1878).
63. Id.
64. State v. Pancoast, 5 N.D. 516; 67 N.W. 1052, 1054 (1896), interpreting N.D. Comp.
Laws § 7312.
65. Pfleeger, 367 P.2d at 408.
66. 559 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1977).
67. Id.
68. 573 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1978). See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
No. 41
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trial, an obligation arises to conduct a supplemental voir dire
to protect the defendant's sixth amendment guarantee to an
impartial jury.69 The Fifth Circuit's reasoning in these two
cases reveals its belief that the judicial proceeding of voir dire
is not part of the actual trial, but instead, precedes the com-
mencement of the trial.
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court in Kansas City Star
Co. v. Fossey70 determined that voir dire was not part of the
actual trial. The issue in Kansas City Star was whether a pre-
trial suppression hearing, conducted by the trial court after the
jury was impanelled but before the jury was sworn, was gov-
erned by the sixth amendment pretrial analysis in Gannett or
the first amendment trial analysis in Richmond Newspapers.
The court concluded that because the hearing took place
before the jury was sworn, the proceeding was a pretrial one
and should therefore be controlled by Gannett.7 This finding
supports Chief Justice Burger's statement in Gannett that "the
timing of a proceeding [is] likely to be critical."72 It also sup-
ports the proposition that voir dire, which takes place before
the jury is sworn, is a pretrial proceeding.73
A different perspective on the consideration of access to voir
dire was presented by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in
Rapid City v. Circuit Court.74 In Rapid City, the court ex-
amined whether there is a constitutional right of access to voir
dire." The South Dakota court used the same reasoning ad-
vanced by the court in Brooklier to find that voir dire is "part
of the trial itself."76 As in Brooklier, the court stated this con-
clusion as though it were uncontroverted.77 Yet, unlike Brook-
Her, Rapid City followed Gannett and held there is no right of
access to voir dire "by virtue of the Sixth Amendment's guar-
antee of a public trial."78
69. 573 F.2d at 364.
70. 230 Kan. 240, 630 P.2d 1176 (1981).
71. Id.
72. 443 U.S. at 395.
73. Note, Federal Criminal Procedure-Juries-Supplemental Voir Dire is Required
When Significant Delay Occurs Between Jury Selection and Start of Trial, 10 ST.
MARY's L.J. 658, 660 (1979).
74. 283 N.W.2d 563 (1979).
75. Id. at 566-67.
76. Id. at 566 n.5.
77. Id. The court merely stated: "[v]oir dire of the jury is part of the trial itself,"
citing Commercial Printing. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
78. 283 N.W.2d at 567.
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The court acknowledged that Gannett involved a pretrial
proceeding and not a stage of the actual trial.7 9 Rather than
base its conclusion on a pretrial versus a trial analysis, the
court in Rapid City framed the critical issue as whether "a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial will be jeopardized .. ."1o Such a
determination required a sixth amendment analysis, and
hence, the Gannett reasoning.8'
In sum, although the courts have not definitively resolved
the question of whether or not voir dire is part of the trial it-
self, there appears to be a significant trend toward concluding
that voir dire is a pretrial judicial proceeding. Further, as evi-
denced by the holding in Rapid City, even when a court finds
that voir dire is part of the trial itself, public access to voir dire
is not necessarily guaranteed.
IV
The Purpose of Voir Dire
Even though the apparent trend of courts is to find that voir
dire is a pretrial judicial proceeding, an analysis of whether
voir dire is governed by Gannett or Richmond Newspapers
cannot stop at this point. It is also necessary to evaluate both
the historical practice and the structural purpose of voir dire.82
Trial by jury can be traced back to the time of the Norman
Conquest of England.83 Juries were originally composed of
men called together as neighbors of litigant parties.84 Further-
more, as the Supreme Court mentioned in Gannett, "there ex-
ists no persuasive evidence that at common law members of
the public had any right to attend pretrial proceedings ...."'I
During the fourteenth century, justices in England were of
the opinion that a juror who was biased against the defendant
was "good for the King."86 The sheriffs would show their alle-
giance to the King by selecting jurors predisposed to the
79. Id. at 566.
80. Id. at 568.
81. Id.
82. 448 U.S. at 589.
83. Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors. I. The English Practice, 16 GEO. L.J.
438 (1927-28).
84. Id. at 439. See also Pollack, The King's Peace in the Middle Ages, 13 HAsv. L.
REV. 177, 187-89 (1899).
85. 443 U.S. at 387.
86. MacGutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional
Right, 39 BRooKLYN L. REV. 290, 292 (1972).
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Crown.87 At common law, the defendant did not have the right
to question jurors on their biases or prejudices. 88 In 1696, in
Peter Cook v. The King,89 a case which received much pretrial
publicity, the court held that a prospective juror should not be
required to answer questions tending "to his own disgrace, dis-
credit or the injury of his character."90
The common law rule, which resulted in the selection of in-
terested parties as jurors, was explicitly rejected by the fram-
ers in the "Sixth Amendment provision that a defendant is
entitled to be tried by an 'impartial jury.' "91
The purpose of the voir dire examination is to safeguard the
right of the criminally accused to a fair trial by a panel of "im-
partial, 'indifferent' jurors."9 2 This right of impartiality re-
quires that voir dire "screen out those [jurors] with fixed
opinions as to guilt or innocence" so the defendant's sixth
amendment constitutional right to an impartial jury is not
abridged.93 Thus, the role of voir dire in the judicial process is
to provide the means for obtaining an impartial jury and not
merely to select jurors.9 4
The purpose of voir dire as a preliminary examination to
screen out those jurors with a fixed opinion as to guilt or inno-
cence is similar to that of the pretrial hearing under considera-
tion in Gannett.9 The Supreme Court in Gannett stated that
"[t] he whole purpose of such hearings is to screen out unrelia-
ble or illegally obtained evidence and insure that this evidence
does not become known to the jury."9 6 This theory of imparti-
ality, traceable to the sixth amendment guarantee of a fair
trial, is for the benefit of the accused.97 The public's right to
know, as protected under the first amendment, attaches after
this preliminary screening stage. In Gannett, the Court stated
that "the principle of publicity only applies to the actual trial of
87. Id.
88. Id. at 293. See also Moore, supra note 83, at 442.
89. Moore, supra note 83, at 442-43 citing Peter Cook v. The King, 13 St. Tr. 333
(1696).
90. Id. at 443.
91. 443 U.S. at 385.
92. United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
93. Note, Fair Trial/Free Press: The Court's Dilemma, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 125, 135
(1977) (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976)).
94. United States v. Williams, 417 F.2d 630, 631 (10th Cir. 1969).
95. 443 U.S. at 378.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 380-81, citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948).
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a case, not necessarily to the preliminary or prefatory stages of
the proceedings."9 8
In order to realize the full implications of the role voir dire
plays in the judicial process, it is important to inquire whether
there are alternative means available to procure an impartial
jury. There are a variety of methods a trial judge can employ
to insure impartiality. A trial judge may grant a continuance,
agree to a change of venue, sequester the jurors and witnesses,
conduct individual voir dire of prospective jurors, or issue cau-
tionary instructions to the jury.99
A defendant will often first move for a change of venue or for
a continuance when claiming there is prejudicial publicity.100
Most courts have adopted the position that the effect of pretrial
publicity can be better determined after the voir dire examina-
tion of the jurors.'0 ' Consequently, absent exceptional circum-
stances, most courts deny these motions if made before voir
dire .102
Issuance of cautionary instructions is generally a means of
preserving an impartial jury after the jury is impanelled.1°3
Similarly, sequestration is a useful procedure once the jurors
are sworn.
104
The Supreme Court commented in both Gannett and Rich-
mond Newspapers that it is not until the commencement of the
trial itself that these various alternatives can "satisfy the con-
stitutional demands of fairness."'0 5 Thus, if such measures are
only available once the trial has begun, then they will not be
available until after voir dire is completed.
As the Court explained in Gannett, when information is pub-
licized during pretrial proceedings, it may never be kept en-
98. Id. at 389, citing E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAw 75 (6th ed. 1967).
99. Revised Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the
Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" issue, 532, 533 (1980). Note, supra note 93
at 125. See also Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1 (1980), where the California
Supreme Court held that prospective jurors should be questioned individually and out
of the presence of other prospective jurors as to death-qualification issues in capital
cases.
100. Note, supra note 93 at 128.
101. Id. at 130. See also United States v. Suchman, 206 F. Supp. 688 (C.D. Md. 1962);
United States v. Dioguardi, 147 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
102. Note, supra note 93 at 128.
103. Id. at 138.
104. Id. at 140.
105. 448 U.S. at 581; See also 443 U.S. at 378-79.
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tirely from potential jurors." 6 "[T] 0 determine the prejudice
among jurors resulting from pretrial publicity, the judge will
usually resort to the voir dire examination."'0 7 This prejudice
must be ascertained before a judge can effectively rule on any
remedial measures. 10 8
In United States v. Layton, °9 the court, presented with the
issue of whether to close the voir dire proceedings, devised
procedures to avoid excluding the public from the voir dire ex-
amination. The court suggested restricting the number of
press present during the proceedings, restricting the dissemi-
nation of the names of potential jurors, 110 admonishing the po-
tential jurors and possibly conducting voir dire without the
media present for particular individuals inhibited by the pres-
ence of the press."'
Despite such cautionary measures, the Supreme Court in
Gannett noted that "[c] losure of pretrial proceedings is often
one of the most effective methods that a trial judge can employ
to attempt to insure that the fairness of a trial will not be jeop-
ardized by the dissemination of such information ... before
the trial itself has even begun.""' 2 The South Dakota Supreme
Court in Rapid City v. Circuit Court also considered closure of
a voir dire proceeding. 1 3 It reasoned that since the trial court
has the duty of assuring a defendant his right to an impartial
jury, it has the discretion to close voir dire to public scrutiny in
a case involving such sensitive issues as abortion and
religion.114
Voir dire is set apart from other remedial measures em-
ployed to insure an impartial jury. It is a preliminary examina-
tion employed by the trial judge before sequestration or before
cautionary instructions are available. Like the pretrial hearing
in Gannett, voir dire involves "special risks of unfairness be-
cause it may influence public opinion against a defendant and
inform potential jurors of inculpatory information wholly inad-
106. 443 U.S. at 378-79.
107. Comment, Discovery of Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity on Voir Dire, 22 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 230, 231 (1965).
108. Id.
109. 519 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
110. The issue of the juror's right of privacy is beyond the scope of this note. See
United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979).
111. 519 F. Supp. at 960.
112. 443 U.S. at 379.
113. 283 N.W.2d 563 (S.D. 1979).
114. Id. at 568.
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missible at the actual trial."11
V
Conclusion
When the court in Brooklier considered whether there is a
constitutional right of access to voir dire, it simply concluded
that voir dire is "part of the trial itself' and is governed by the
holding in Richmond Newspapers, thereby allowing a right of
access to voir dire based on the first amendment." 6 The
Brooklier court also pointed to the historic view of the open
public trial to support its conclusion." 7 However, voir dire is
separate from the idea of a public trial both in its history and
purpose. It is founded on the concept of an impartial jury, a
concept which is today based on the sixth amendment right to
a fair trial. Since the purpose of voir dire, to preserve imparti-
ality, is the same as that of other pretrial proceedings, analysis
of voir dire should come within the sixth amendment consider-
ations of Gannett and not the first amendment trial analysis of
Richmond Newspapers. Because the alternative methods of
protecting jurors from publicity are generally not available un-
til after voir dire, it is important that the defendant's sixth
amendment interests be protected during this critical stage of
the judicial proceedings.
Chief Justice Burger once noted, "[i]f the authors of [the
first and sixth amendments,] fully aware of the potential con-
flict between them, were unwilling or unable to resolve the is-
sue by assigning to one priority over the other, it is not for us to
rewrite the Constitution by undertaking what they declined to
do.""' 8 The Supreme Court, however, has distinguished the
sixth amendment pretrial considerations from the first amend-
ment trial principles in interpreting the public's constitutional
right of access to the courtroom. Following the Court's treat-
ment of this issue, the historical practice and structural pur-
pose of voir dire indicate that voir dire requires a sixth
amendment pretrial analysis as in Gannett and the public has
no constitutionally guaranteed right to attend voir dire.
115. 443 U.S. at 369.
116. 685 F.2d at 1167.
117. Id.
118. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976).
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